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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1953
Two-hundred and fifty-eight opinions were filed by the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington during 1953. 135 decisions of the
superior courts were affirmed, 74 were reversed, and 31 others were
reversed in part or modified in some respect.
Two of the most publicized decisions were General Electric Co. v.
State, 42 Wn.2d 411, 256 P.2d 265 (1953), reversed 74 Sup. Ct. 474
(1954) and Lundquist v. Coca Cola Bottling, Inc., 42 Wn.2d 170, 254
P.2d 488 (1953).
In the first case, General Electric brought suit to recover from the
state nearly a million dollars in business and occupation taxes. General
Electric contended that its construction and operation of the Hanford
atomic works in eastern Washington was, in effect, an activity of the
Atomic Energy Commission; hence, the tax exemption granted by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 extended to them. The Washington Court
held that General Electric was an independent contractor which could
not claim the tax exemption. The United States Supreme Court reversed.
In the second case, a bus driver found the decayed remains of a
mouse in his almost finished bottle of "Coke." He recovered damages
resulting from the breach of an implied warranty of sale.
To explain why neither of these cases has been included in this survey
is to define sufficiently the purposes and scope of the survey. The
General Electric case was omitted because, though it presented a legal
problem with both novelty and interest, the practical impact of the
decision on Washington law was nil. The mouse-in-the-bottle case was
omitted because, though factually interesting, the opinion is nothing
more than the expectable application of a well settled rule of law.
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Of the 258 opinions considered by the editorial board, 64 have been
given textual treatment below. Brief summaries of 28 others appear
at the end of the appropriate section. An additional 12 have been
treated in footnotes.
Fields in which no cases believed worthy of note were found are:
Administrative Law, Agency, Bills & Notes, Corporations, Equity,
Partnerships, Public Utilities, and Social Security.
For a survey of statutory law enacted during 1953, see Washington
Legislation-1953, 28 WASH. L. REV. 167 (1953).
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Jurisdiction-Order Affecting Possession of Foreign Land. In
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Molitor,' the Supreme Court held that a trial
court in Washington lacked "jurisdiction" to order a litigant personally
before the court to give up possession of land in Alaska. The litigation
was commenced by a vendor of an interest in land against the vendee
for breach of contract. Prior to trial the plaintiff-vendor moved for an
order directing the defendant-vendee to surrender all right, title and
possession of the premises described in the agreement. The trial judge
indicated he would issue the order. The defendant then applied to the
Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition which was granted.
The court indicated that the order of the trial court would require
the defendant to do an affirmative act outside the state affecting real
property located outside the state and hence was not within the jurisdiction of the court.
Generally, a trial court will not issue such an order under circumstances similar to those found in this case. Refusal is usually based
upon principles of sovereignty (a state has a sovereign or inherent
right to decide exclusively controversies affecting land located within
its borders 2 ), or upon pragmatic reasons (a state in which property is
1143 Wash. Dec. 606, 263 P.2d 276 (1953).
2 The significance of the situs of real property is demonstrated in the prevailing rule
that actions in law (including the action of trespass) involving property are "local"
and not "transitory"; hence, the venue must be laid in the county in wihch the property
is located. This distinction between "local" and "transitory" actions (which is often
criticized) is usually traced in this country to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203, Fed. Case No. 8411 (1811). Even Marshall
indicated that he could not discern a reason other than a technical one for the distinction. See Taylor v. Sommers Bros. Match Co., 35 Idaho 30, 204 Pac. 472 (1922). A
court of equity cannot make a decree operating directly on land in another state. Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87 (1891). Nor need any decree attempting to do so be
given full faith and credit. Fail v. Fall, 70 Neb. 694, 113 N.W. 174 (1907), affirmed in
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).

